Using the Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) as a micro foundation, we create a decomposable index to evaluate the unfairness of representation in electoral districts.
Introduction
In the construction of electoral districts, apportionments are generally given to states, prefectures, etc., after which those regions create individual districts. This is the case in many countries, including New Zealand, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada. Since the number of representatives is a very small integer and there are often geographical difficulties, perfect proportionality would be impossible. An index is therefore required for evaluating the unfairness of representation.
Proportionality between votes and seats has been studied often by authors such as Gallagher (1991) , Pennisi (1998) , and Taagepera and Grofman (2003) . However, the indexes used in those studies do not have a micro foundation, nor do they have a consentaneous index.
In Section 2, we propose an index using the Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) as a micro foundation to evaluate the unfairness of representation in electoral districts. After presenting some characters in Section 3 and explaining decomposability in Section 4, we derive an apportionment method to minimize the index for apportionments in Section 5.
As shown in Table 1 , popular indexes are based on some kind of distance (L p -norm) between population ratio and apportionment ratio. This implies that their optimal integer solution for apportionment is given by the Hamilton method (largest remainder), which induces the Alabama and population paradoxes (Balinski and Young, 1982) . The optimal integer solution of our index for apportionment yields the divisor method with a threshold of the logarithmic mean. It never induces the Alabama or population paradoxes.
1 After describing some empirical results in Sections 6 and 7, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
[ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Index for Evaluating the Unfairness of Representation
The Nash Bargaining Solution is a unique solution that satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of affine transformation, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is the best-known bargaining solution in the field of economics. Since the Nash solution is obtained by maximizing the product of a player's payoff, its product, which is called the Nash product, is often used as the Nash Social Welfare Function.
The problem of creating electoral districts is defined as a problem of dividing representatives among people. Let us suppose that the population of district i is x i , and the total population is X. The population of district i is normalized as x i /X. When the total number of representatives is n, the number of representatives in each district is normalized as 1/n. If we assume that the representatives are equally divided in district i, the number of representatives per person can get is expressed as X x n i 1 . Thus, we can determine the Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) as
When we take the log of this function and insert a minus sign, it becomes our index. ( n X x = is the average population of the districts.)
The form of this index-the Kullback-Leibler divergence (relative entropy) of x i from x divided by X-is exactly same as that of the Theil index, which is often used to analyze the inequality of income distribution.
2 The Theil index is based on the idea of information entropy and is often criticized because it is not intuitively understood. In contrast, in our study, the index W is based on the widely supported Nash product and is intuitively understood. 
We can confirm this equation when 2 1
When the population of all districts is the same, the value of the index is zero. When one district holds almost the whole population and the other districts' populations fall to near zero, the value of the index heads toward lnn. The Theil index used for evaluating income distribution is criticized for this dependency on n, which in this context stands for population.
However, in our index, n stands for the total number of districts or representatives, so a larger n makes proportionality easier. We can understand that n is the penalty for easiness.
Decomposing the Index for Factor Analysis
The Theil index is a decomposable index. Since our index has the same form, we can As shown in the case of the United States, illustrated in Figure 1 , it is possible to divide states equally in order to make W D j zero. If it is necessary to retain the borders of cities or counties, the optimal districting procedure (Sakaguchi and Wada, 2008) should be used. In addition, the following is a way in which to obtain an integer solution (apportionment) to minimize the index, W A .
According to the population of each state,
, we allocate the apportionment,
The optimal apportionment must satisfy the following condition:
The term 'optimal ' implies the following: This apportionment satisfies the divisor methods (Balinski and Young 1982) , so we can restate it as follows.
Find a divisor d so that j n s, which are the special rounded numbers of the quotients of states, d X j , add up to the required total, n. Here, 'special rounded' means rounded up when the quotient is equal to or bigger than the logarithmic mean, instead of the arithmetic mean, of both side integers. (When n j = 1, this value is set at 0.)
Some Findings on Apportionments [Figures 2 through 7 about here]
Figures 2 through 7 show the situation of each country's apportionment. Clearly, the main problem lies in the treatment of small territories (states etc.). The provision, or lack thereof, of a single seat can significantly change the situation of these small areas. U.S. and Australian apportionments maintain proportionality and swing small states' or territories' apportionments to both sides. They keep the value of the indexes good (small). Canada and the U.K. give special treatment to the small territories or countries and allow the indexes to become bad (large). The main problem in Japan comes from skewed apportionment, which gives one seat to all prefectures and then doles out apportionments by the largest remainder. The Hill method, or the United States House method, assures one seat to every state and maintains some proportionality. The Japanese method, in contrast, does not have any foundation of proportionality.
Some Findings on Districting [Figures 8 through 13 about here]
As Figures 8 through 13 show, countries that allow malapportionment also allow unequal districting. Japan's pyramidal distribution comes from considering only the ratio of the most populous districts' population to the least populous districts' population after forcing through the malapportionment. The most advantageous (less populated) prefectures and the most disadvantageous (populated) prefectures are split equally in order to avoid creating less populated and more populated districts, since these are used to calculate the ratio.
Conclusion
Our index has the same function form as the Theil index, which is a special case of the [Tables 4 through 9 here]
Appendix: Equity between Representatives
If we addressed the equity between n representatives rather than the equity between people, our problem would become a cost allocation problem. Here, the cost is the people whom the representatives must serve. The Nash product (Nash Social Welfare Function) would then become the following:
In this case, after taking the log and inserting a minus sign, the index of unfairness becomes 
We can then transform the inequality as follows: This apportionment satisfies the divisor methods (Balinski and Young 1982) , so we can restate it as follows.
Find a divisor d so that j n s, the special rounded numbers of the quotients of states, d X j , add up to the required total, n. Here, 'special rounded' means that we round up when the quotient is equal to or bigger than the identric mean, instead of the arithmetic mean, of both side integers. Table 2 shows, indexes that give the integer solutions without the paradoxes do not have symmetry between population ratio and apportionment ratio. Symmetry between people would be very important for equity, but the symmetry between population ratio and apportionment ratio would not. In the case of the equity index of the income distribution, the symmetry between population ratio and income ratio usually does not matter. Table 3 shows, index W A , as well as the Hill method, gives at least one seat to any state. We can see the actual problem of w A and the Webster method in the case of Canada (Table 9) . Table 1 Traditional indexes (which can be used as objective functions) based on the distance between population ratio and apportionment ratio Name Definition Based on Allocation method
Hamilton (Largest remainder)
Hamilton (Largest remainder)
X j : population of j state (X: total population) n j : apportionment for j state (n: total apportionment) k: number of states Table 2 Traditional Indexes (which can be used as objective functions) and our indexes that give divisor methods 
